Legend writes:
The word "Intent" appears exactly 0 times!
Rrhain writes:
Incorrect. I quoted you the text of the bill:
Tell us, Legend, what is the 24th word in that sentence? I read it as "intends."
it is indeed "intends.". Like I said, the word "Intent" appears exactly 0 times. Which is TRUE. What is your problem? We're doing word counts here, aren't we?
Rrhain writes:
I see "intent" listed seven times
Wrong! "Intent" is listed 0 times! What's the problem? You start to play word games and when I join in you cry blue murder?!
Rrhain writes:
Surely you aren't being so disingenuous as to claim that the only way "intent" can be meant is if the specific sequence of letters, i-n-t-e-n-t, is invoked, are you?
Hold on....You're claiming it's disingenuous to state that "intends to" doesn't refer to "Intent" in the context of Criminal Law but at the same time you're supporting that the presence of "intends to" in reference to a follow-on action to the primary Act means "Intent to commit the Act". Who's really being disingenuous here?
Rrhain writes:
That "intends" doesn't really mean "intent"?
"Intending to" achieve a specific goal after the Act is
not the same as the *
design or deliberation to commit the Act*, which is what the
definiton of general Intent is.
I'm quoting you
Criminal Law here and you're responding with "ah yes, but look it says 'intends to' here, therefore it's the Intent to commit the Act in question". Last time I came across this argument it was on the Biblical fora!
If you think that the definitions of Motive and Intent I'm supplying are invalid then now's the time to explain why and how.
If you think that the "intends to" bit refers to the primary Act in the paragraph then now's the time to explain why and how.
Rrhain writes:
I see we're repeating the "intend" doesn't actually mean "intend" argument.
Legend writes:
No, we're repeating that "usage of the word 'intends' here doesn't show Intent in the legal sense of the word".
Rrhain writes:
And the difference between your phrasing and mine is what, precisely?
You're arguing that my position is that 'X' doesn't mean 'X'. I'm claiming that "acting with intent to achieve X" is different to "acting with purpose or deliberation to act", i.e. 'Intent' in the legal sense. I'm also arguing that "acting intending to achieve X" is conceptually and effectively akin to "acting because of a desire to achieve X", i.e. 'Motive' in the legal sense. Further down in this post I'm showing you why this is a correct interpretation and that respectable lawmen, as well as me, also think along these lines.
Rrhain writes:
Your argument is that when the law uses the word "intent," it doesn't actually "show 'intent' in the legal sense of the word."
My argument is that when the law says "intends to", it isn't referring to the primary Act, (i.e. Actus Reus, i.e. threatening behaviour) but to a sub-sequent aim, It is therefore *
not* the general Intent of the Act, as defined by Criminal Law .
If you think that the "intends to" bit refers to the primary Act in the paragraph then now's the time to explain why and how.
Rrhain writes:
See, this is why your little public relations announcements are failing you. A press release from the Home Office is not the law.
the Home Office are the people who *
made* the law. They are the people responsible for the enforcement the law. Are you seriously suggesting that
they don't know what their very own laws are all about!?!. That *
YOU* know better? Blimey, just how conceited are you exactly?
Rrhain writes:
So when they say, "motivated," we cannot be sure if they are using legalese or if they are using words that can be understood by people who are not trained in the law.
If the Home Office web-site says "motivated" you can be pretty sure that it's used in the colloquial sense as that's the web-site's intended audience. It's not for lawyers, it's for the general public. The same also goes for the FBI site I linked to. Not that it matters much in this case as the legal usage of "Motive" doesn't differ from the colloquial one anyway.
So yes, when the people who made the law tell you what their law is all about, you choose to not believe them and latch onto a technicality in the letter of the law that you think supports your interpretation. Right......!
Rrhain writes:
This is in sharp contrast when reading actual legislation. There is no other context to read it in: It was written by lawyers for lawyers and can only be understood in a legal context.
Oh really? Then why do you think the law feels the need to give definitions of common terms and words that are used in the text?
quote:
programme means any item which is included in a programme service;
programme service has the same meaning as in the Broadcasting Act 1990;
publish, and related expressions, in relation to written material, shall be construed in accordance with section 29C(2);
religious hatred has the meaning given by section 29A;
recording has the meaning given by section 29E(2), and play and show, and related expressions, in relation to a recording, shall be construed in accordance with that provision;
written material includes any sign or other visible representation.
If such a term as "publish" can only be understood in a legal context then what's the point of clarifying it's usage here when the term is already
well used and understood in a legal context? Could it be because the term has a specific meaning here besides its colloquial sense? And why is the term "intend to" not defined here? Could it because it's just used in it's old-fashioned colloquial sense. Not that it matters much as "intend to" here is not referring to the primary Act in the first place, but nevertheless I just wanted to point out that you're talking crap.
Rrhain writes:
Are you saying the law isn't intended (hah!) to be understood in a legal context?
It's meant to be understood in the context it's written in. If the law refers to threatening behaviour aiming to stir up religious hatred then the "stir up hatred" bit is describing what in legal terms is called a 'specific Intent', which is the state of mind causing the accused to act in that specific way in order to achieve something beyond the primary Act. The distinction between specific intent and Motive is often blurred and artificial, as I point out below. What
causes the accused to act, (i.e. the Motive) is the desire to "stir up hatred". Just because it's worded differently doesn't mean that it isn't the reason why the accused acted the way he did.
This from the
Buffalo Criminal Law Review :
quote:
Motive is ulterior intention the intention with which an intentional act is done.
Consider the following discussion by Glanville Williams, in which he concedes that the irrelevance of motive claim is indeterminate,
tautologous, or descriptively false, and yet opts to preserve it as an empty tautology for unexplained reasons of convenience:
quote:
In criminal law, it is generally convenient to use the term intention with reference to intention as to the constituents of the actus reus, and the term motive with reference to the intention with which these constituents were brought about. The definition of some crimes involves an intention to commit another crime. . . . It is commonly called by lawyers a specific intent.
Williams goes on to concede that several offenses are defined by reference to motives. He does not object to the mental elements of these offenses, but recommends that they be referred to as ulterior intentions rather than motives, for the sake of convenience.
............................................
Wayne LaFave also wonders if the notion that motives are irrelevant in the substantive law requires that the word ‘motive’ be defined as those purposes and objectives which are deemed irrelevant. . . .He suggests that it would be better to abandon the difficult task of trying to distinguish intent from motive and merely acknowledge that the substantive criminal law takes account of some desired ends but not others.
(emphasis is mine)
In other words, even distinguished lawmen admit that the "specific intent" term is often tautologous with "motive" but it's a preferred term for reasons of "convenience". Even distinguished lawmen admit that laws sometimes single out certain motives merely on the basis of practicality and ease of application. But not
you, you 've just seen the phrase "intends to" and are hanging on to it as if it was the last life-raft on Titanic!
Legend writes:
what does whether everyone in the legal profession believe that such laws punish motive instead of intent have to do with it?
Rrhain writes:
Oh, my god. You really are arguing that. You really are arguing that in an actual law written by lawyers for lawyers and can only be understood in a legal context, the word "intent" doesn't really mean "intent" but actually means "motive," even though every defense lawyer would jump upon this as failure of the prosecution to meet its burden, that they have only provided evidence of motive, not intent, and thus demand an immediate dismissal of all charges due to failure to meet the standard of proof.
Which is exactly why the law is written the way it's written. The lawyers have to prove or disprove 'specific intent' which is fine and dandy as there are already other laws setting such a precedent. Of course what is actually being punished is the motive of the accused, i.e. the reason why he acted the way he did. But it doesn't matter, as long as it's expressed as specific intent then no one can claim that the standard of proof isn't being met.
Someone uses threatening behaviour. What caused him to act?
1) A desire to extort money
2) a need to prevent a witness at a trial from testifying
3) a sadistic enjoyment of causing fear in people
4) a desire to stir up racial hatred
All of the above are motives and to argue that ONLY the last one can be plucked out and given special treatment is to make an argument of equivocation that all the first three are indeed reasons why the Act was commited while only the last one is somehow a "specific goal" unrelated to the cause of the primary Act!
Rrhain writes:
They don't. They believe it punishes intent.
Whether the lawyers believe the law to punish motive or intent is completely irrelevant. Punishing motive may be unethical, sinister and harmful but it's not illegal, quite the opposite. The law clearly says that threatening with intent to stir hatred is illegal. The lawyers will try to prove or disprove that the accused's aim was to achieve the "stirring up of hatred" they won't stand up and claim "M'lawd, this law clearly punishes Motive and therefore I refuse to prosecute the defendant!".
So do us a favour and stop throwing red herrings into the forum.
Rrhain writes:
Your argument is that everybody is insane.
Not everyone. Just you.
After all *
you* are the person suggesting that the Home Office and FBI really don't know what the laws they are making/enforcing are all about!
You are the one suggesting that countless legal dictionaries and web-sites are wrong and *
you* are the only one really understanding that hate-crime laws don't really punish Motive!
You are the one claiming that something worded as a secondary aim and subsequent to the Act itself is the actual Intent of the Act, despite what the legal definition of Intent is.
The Legal Dictionary writes:
A Hate Crime is one crime that requires proof of a certain motive. Generally, a hate crime is motivated by the defendant's belief regarding a protected status of the victim, such as the victim's religion, sex, disability, customs, or national origin. In states that prosecute hate crimes, the prosecution must prove that the defendant was motivated by animosity toward a protected status of the victim. Hate-crime laws are exceptions to the general rule that proof of motive is not required in a criminal prosecution.
The Law Dictionary writes:
A crime motivated by racial, religious, gender, sexual orientation, or other prejudice.
A hate crime is based, at least in part, on the defendant's belief regarding the status of the victim.
Legal Definitions website writes:
A hate crime is usually defined by state law as one that involves threats, harassment, or physical harm and is motivated by prejudice against someone's race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sexual orientation or physical or mental disability.
"We must respect the law, not let it blind us away from the basic principles of fairness, justice and freedom"
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