Does Evolution Have An Objective?

This "not wholly determined by prior events" bit is your interjection. We experience being able to initiate events; and we can and we do.I don't even know what "not wholly determined by prior events" would feel like or not. We experience initiating things; and we do initiate things. We experience making choices; and we do make choices. We experiences choices having consequences; and they do have consequences.The perfectly normal, ordinary experiences and definitions of freewill and choice are entirely compatible with reality. The only thing which isn't is a version that asserts dualism, and a version which asserts non-causality. These are not experiential; in fact, if one considers them deeply they're extraordinarily contrary to our actual experiences.

Do we? Can our conscious will be ultimately responsible for the path of a particular causal chain as per conceptions of genuine freewill? Or are we actually just a functional input/output link in a deterministic causal chain? Which is exactly where the idea that genuine freewill is a "problem" comes from. And far better men than I, 1.6, CS, Dogma etc. etc. etc. have described the notion of freewill as a "problem". Why do you think that is exactly? Can I ask you this - Why do you think people keep disagreeing with your usage of terminology if it is absolutely standard and entirely in line with common conceptual meaning?

I haven't seen anyone denying that there is a difference in conception between an incoherent view of something experienced in nature and a coherent view of something experienced in nature. But if someone has made this argument, it was not me. Indeed, my position is that the common notions about these subjects are filled with 'magic'. Right, but it is not a trick that is magic is it? Nor is it part of a show that is magic. It is the illusion of magic, but is still called 'magic' colloquially and technically (eg., The Magic Circle).The real point is that these illusions are the only magic that is real. REAL Magic is not real! As Lee Siegel wrote

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I’m writing a book on magic, I explain, and I’m asked, Real magic? By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. No, I answer: Conjuring tricks, not real magic. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is
not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic.

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As I said: If you want to ask 'do we have free will' and you mean 'do we have some Cartesian actor that is non-deterministic or non-causal' then my answer would be 'no'. If, instead you want to say 'That we have freewill is apparent, I can freely choose to eat this banana or not', then I would concur that that thing exists but that the choices being made are deterministic, which may seem counterintuitive - but so what?Unfortunately, since the concept of free will is generally expressed incoherently it is difficult to know what any given person actually means when it is said. I'm not surprised that people object to it, but then people object to the notion that the apparently conscious design of life is just an illusion of design, so why would I be surprised?Sometimes, science or philosophy forces us to confront the fact that our common intuitive notions are erroneous or entirely backwards. I was looking for a pithy quote about this and came upon this blog entry about shifting folk intuitions about free will - I didn't read it, but a skim looked vaguely interesting and relevant. The quote I was looking for is the source of the name of the blog:

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Yes, we have a soul, but it's made up of lots of tiny robots. --
Giulio Giorello {translated}

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And, switching to the topic of the thread - even Richard Dawkins has caught himself talking about biology and evolution in teleological terms. Perhaps saying something like 'the genes want to replicate'. We just have to learn to live with this tendency of ours, it appears.

Yes. But that is because historically those doing magic tricks have sought to convince their audience that they are doing real magic. It is an intentional conflation. And we are left with the linguistic hangover from that. Nobody consciously decided (hah!) that this dual meaning of terminology would be helpful in making the distinction between the two different concepts. Quite the opposite in fact.The common meanings of "freewill" and "choice" are not derived from deep philosophical thought or the latest scientific research. These words and their meanings are derived from our experience. And our experience is that we are capable of initiating conscious will to make conscious decisions that are not wholly determined by prior events in a way that restricts us to a single outcome. Regardless of whether this experience is illusory or not - This is what the words freewill and choice mean to all but a few philosophers and scientists who use more precise and technical definitions for their own precise and technical reasons.Unless compatibilist philosophers are trying to convince an audience that their more technical definition of freewill is the same as the popular conception of freewill in the same way that an illusionist might try to convince an audience that he is doing real magic (for dramatic effect, increased impressiveness or whatever) - I really don't see why a different term, or the same term clearly identified as a technical use of the same word (ala "energy" as used by physicists), would do anything other than aid clarity. I agree entirely. But words gain meaning through conceptual use rather than what science reveals to be actually real or not.If you want to point out that the common conceptual meaning is a bit woolly, incoherent even, around the edges — I am not going to disagree with you. If you want to point out that the common conceptual meaning refers to something that isn't real - Again I won't disagree with you. But the same is equally true for lots of human concepts. I would even go so far as to say that if we limited ourselves only to concepts that held up to rigorous philosophical analysis and scientific evidential consistency that there wouldn’t be many human concepts left (exist and "self" and solid and now spring to mind as immediately problematic). So before embarking on the argument that freewill and determinism are compatible it should first be acknowledged that the intuitive conceptual meanings of "freewill" and "choice" (where the outcome of your potential banana munching is not able to be determined until you consciously decide what to do because you are genuinely free to do either) is NOT compatible with determinism.Then more technical or precise definitions that are compatible can be presented along with the reasons one might want to adopt these definitions in place of less precise and more intuitively derived ones. This clarification would avoid most of the 'yes it is' Vs 'no it isn't' that has been the content of this thread. The objections in this thread relate to the statement that freewill and determinism are compatible. Absolutely. And this is just such a case. But why is there a reluctance to make a linguistic distinction between the intuitive notion and the philosophically coherent and evidentially consistent one? Why are these being needlessly conflated through unnecessary use of the same terminology? I think the instinct to ascribe conscious intent is so ingrained in us and so entwined in our language that using the same terminology for precise philosophical definitions will just lead to endless wrangling over things like whether or not freewill and determinism are compatible.Obviously whether thay are compatible or not entirely depends on what you mean by "freewill" and "determinism".

Yeah, but to me it would seem obvious that a person that is talking about free will being incompatible with determinism would be talking about "some Cartesian actor that is non-deterministic or non-causal". Dontcha think?Just like a person talking about magic not being real wouldn't be talking about the tricks performed by an illusionist.

Of course. But then, those people are then talking about something for which there is no evidence of its existence, dontcha think?

And we can make choices by these meanings, but whether we have freewill or not depends on what the individual in question means when they say it, which varies from person to person. No - compatabilists are quite clear that their version of freewill is different than the common intuition, but that they are pointing to the same experiences.^* But likewise, science and philosophy can be used to change the common conceptual use. Consider that in colloquial 'I weigh 60kg' - but scientifically I actually weigh 600N and have a mass of 60kg. I've not disputed this. Just that the thing we call freewill, that sense we have of free will, is compatible with determinism. And they can be, but it means rethinking what freewill actually is - rather than what philosophers of old, and maybe our personal intuitions tell us it is. The word 'choice' does not imply non-causality and it would be foolish to insist it does. Freewill is another issue, and compatabilists do specify what it is they mean when they say it is compatible with determinism.

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^* or I should say that they suggest the solution to the problem of freewill can be resolved with an understanding of freewill that is deterministic while retaining moral responsibility.abe: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides a good overview:

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If we are to understand compatibilism as a solution to the free will problem, it would be useful to have some sense of the problem itself. Unfortunately, just as there is no single notion of free will that unifies all of the work philosophers have devoted to it, there is no single specification of the free will problem. In fact, it might be more helpful to think in terms of a range of problems. Regardless, any formulation of the problem can be understood as arising from a troubling sort of entanglement of our concepts, an entanglement that seems to lead to contradictions, and thus that cries out for a sort of disentangling. In this regard, the free will problem is a classic philosophical problem; we are, it seems, committed in our thought and talk to a set of concepts which, under scrutiny, appear to comprise a mutually inconsistent set. Formally, to settle the problemto disentangle the setwe must either reject some concepts, or instead, we must demonstrate that the set is indeed consistent despite its appearance to the contrary

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Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

Conscious - no, because as you've already agreed the unconscious is also important. Which is why I say we.The rest of your statement is simply a false dichotomy. We are part of a deterministic* causal chain and we are ultimately responsible for our actions. You cannot determine our actions without reference to us. Because of lingering dualistic nonsense. This entire site is dedicated to arguing with people who are wrong about stuff why should I find arguing about a new thing that people are wrong about surprising in any way?* - actually, of course, I think the universe is probabilistic not strictly deterministic but it makes no real difference. Probabilism does nothing to save non-causal conceptions of self.

No. No.The heart's autonomous nervous system is a simple responsive system to the best of my knowledge. It does not maintain a flexible conception of objectives or means to achieve such objectives.

As this thread is demonstrating the common conceptual meaning of choice requires that there be more than one possible outcome in a way that does not seem at all compatible with determinism. Coherent or not this is the objection. Sure they can. But if this thread demonstrates anything it is that the most philosophically and scientifically savvy are using the terms choice" and "freewill" differently to everybody else. But why call it "freewill" rather than something more accurate, less easily confused with intuitive notions and less emotionally evocative? Why not call it 'determined-will' (or some-such)? The more I look into this the more it seems to me that compatibilism is all about redefining the word "freewill" (and thus indirectly "choice") to make the (relatively) fixed ideas of determinism and moral responsibility logically compatible.My personal inclination is to take another route. To accept that (the popular conception of) freewill is an illusion (if determinism is true). To accept that moral responsibility based on this concept of freewill doesn't exist (if determinism is true). And to then point out that from any practical point of view we have to go through the illusion of freewill and moral responsibility regardless.That there could well be social consequences to this rather nihilistic approach may well explain why a different approach has been taken. But from a purely philosophical perspective isn't this a more honest approach than force fitting a bunch of concepts together that don't actually fit?

I dunno, it seems to be a straight-forward and intuitive conclusion based on our common experiences. I think the opposite would be what those people would need evidence for to accept.

And therein lies the source of your confusion in this thread. The people using terms differently to you are not wrong about what those terms mean. Words conceptually mean what people use them to mean. They don't always mean what is scientifically accurate or philosophically coherent. In reality "us" are physical input/output devices called brains. But conceptually "us" are minds capable of shaping reality through conscious decisions. Our language reflects the illusion rather than the reality.

In reality we are minds capable of shaping reality through conscious decisions and input/output devices called brains and the rest of our physical form.Our language correctly reflects the fact that we are conscious and causal agents.It is not an illusion.

You previously made it clear that you think that cognition can exist without consciousness. Would you hold something that is cognisant but not conscious as responsible for it's choices? Deterministically speaking the brain is just a complex responsive system the actions of which were determined by events that preceded it's own existence isn't it? I have no idea what you mean by "maintain a flexible conception of objectives or means to achieve such objectives", what is required to do this or why this is the key to taking responsibility for one's choices.Can a nematode "maintain a flexible conception of objectives or means to achieve such objectives"....? Can an Excel spreadsheet? Can an AI computer programme of the sort that exists today do this?Is a sleepwalking human capable of emailing friends and inviting them to dinner able to "maintain a flexible conception of objectives or means to achieve such objectives"......?What exactly is it that you think makes one responsible for ones choices?
Or do you just sort of know it when you see it?

Whether you like it or not the common conceptual meaning of the terms freewill and choice (in the context of freewill) requires conscious decisions between genuinely possible alternatives.You yourself have described conscious decision making as largely illusory. You have also made clear that the only form of "choice" that is compatible with determinism is one where only a single outcome wholly dictated by past events is possible.If determinism is true then freewill as commonly conceived is an illusion.