Identifying false religions.

I agree, but that doesn;t even matter.If I roll 20-sided dice, each possible result has a 5% chance - far more than once chance in an infinite set. It would be irrational in the extreme to say "the dice will come up as a 7, because I like 7." The chance that it will be 7 is exactly the same that it will be 8, or 12, or 20.The irrationality doesn;t simply lie in choosing an extremely unlikely possibility. If there were a 6% chance that the die would land as a 7, then choosing 7 over 8 or 12 would be rational because it would be more likely than the other results, even if it's still a small chance.The irrationality lies in saying that 7 is more likely even though the actual probability that 7 will be the result is identical to the other possibilities.RAZD's irrationality doesn't necessarily lie in believing that an unlikely possibility is the most likely (though that's still a far cry from confidently saying that the unlikely possibility is likely to reflect reality...).Hi irrationality lies in selecting one of many equally probable or improbable possibilities and saying "this one is more likely because it's personally preferable to me."Just like with my previous analogy: who is the murderer, when you have zero evidence? If we have several hundred thousand individuals who have not been falsified, but no evidence of a murder, is it rational to say "I think it's likely that Jimmy did it," when there is an equal chance that any of them could be the murderer?Of course, the probability is still greater that the murder never happened (and absence of evidence can only ever be evidence of absence even if it's not proof, else the absence of a dragon in my garage is evidence that there is a dragon in my garage, an obvious logical absurdity)...

Yet curiously you feel it's appropriate to believe in a deity. Why are you comfortable making a decision given inadequate evidence to distinguish amongst multiple equally probable hypotheses in one scenario, but not in another?Why are you incapable of recognizing that an absence of evidence always adds a higher probability to the hypothesis of absence than to any other possibility, and therefore the hypotheses with the highest probability of accuracy are that no murder ever occurred, and that gods do not exist? And yet you yourself are not an agnostic - you're a deist. Are you acknowledging that your position is irrational?Beyond that, of course, we don't really have a total absence of evidence, just as we don't really have a total lack of evidence for our hypothetical murder - the absence of a dead body, a murder weapon, or signs of a struggle are all observations which support the hypothesis that no murder ever occurred much more strongly than they support any particular hypothesis involving a murder. Indeed, and this once again begs the question of how you can recognize agnosticism as the only rational position given zero evidence, and yet still believe in a deity - cognitive dissonance? Yet in reality we do have the ability to make observations, and we do not actually have a complete and utter lack of evidence regarding deities. If we did, as I allowed for the purpose of the argument earlier, then the only rational position would be agnosticism...and yet this requires that we make ourselves blind and deaf to the observations we are able to make.A more accurate statement than "there is no evidence regarding deities" would be "there are no observations that increase the probability of the existence of any particular deity beyond any others." There are many observations, however, that increase the probability that no gods exist, just as the observation of a clean and empty desk increases the probability that there is in fact no pen on my desk. And again, if you think we have a total absence of evidence, why do you feel comfortable taking a position when you admit that the only rational position is agnosticism? You miss one very, very important fact, RAZD, as you always do:I allowed the premise that we are operating under a total absence of evidence for the sake of argument, to illustrate the fact that if we had a total lack of evidence, then the only rational position would be agnosticism, and that this means that your position (that a deity does exist) constitutes an irrational and unjustified inflation of your own personal estimation of the probability of one hypothesis over all competing hypotheses. In short, your own position of deism would be irrational, as it would require you to say that one of the possible results of a roll of the dice is more likely than the others. However, reality is not a roll of the dice. We do have the ability to make observations, even though none of our observations can truly be absolutely conclusive. We do have the ability to analyze those observations and see which hypotheses they favor most strongly. And the fact of the matter is, even though we cannot falsify all conceivable deities (as you like to say, even if all A are B, all B are not necessarily A), we can determine whether the hypothesis that no gods are present is more probable than all of the individual god hypotheses.Every time we make an observation that does not require gods, the hypothesis that there are no gods is supported more strongly than any of the god hypotheses - because in a Universe with no gods, we would anticipate that no gods would be required in any observation 100% of the time, while individual god hypotheses can accommodate a lack of observations that require gods less than 100% of the time.It's true that Jimmy could be our hypothetical murderer. The prospect hasn't been falsified. It's possible that he simply cleaned up the mess so well that no evidence was left behind. But it is more probable given absolutely no observations supporting any murder hypothesis that no murder actually occurred. The possibility that Jimmy would perfectly hide all evidence that a murder took place is extremely unlikely even assuming a murder did take place, and so the observation of no murder evidence does not very strongly support that hypothesis; the possibility that no murder evidence would be found if no muder actually took place is nearly 100%, and so that hypothesis is supported far more strongly by the same observation.This is the position of the agnostic atheist: we can't know for sure, but it's more probable that no gods exist. Are you or are you not a deist, RAZD? If yes, than you believe in a deity, which is one of many equally probable unfalsifiable mutually exclusive conceivable deities. You have chosen to artificially inflate your own personal estimation of the probability that your hypothesis is correct over the probability that other hypotheses are correct, despite no observations that increase the probability of your hypothesis over others.Or do you have an observation that increases the probability of your hypothesis beyond that of others? So far, your argument has seemed to rest on just a few simple points:1) Unfalsified and logically self-consistent hypotheses are still logically valid
2) Falsification of A does not falsify B, because even if all A are B, all B are not necessarily A
3) All things being equal and in the absence of evidence, belief comes down to personal preferenceYou've specifically declined to discuss your position as a deist except in the most general and broad sense, and so all I have to work with here is what you've given me. Feel free to clarify your position ifI agree with 1), except that I would point out that logical validity does not carry any weight suggesting actuality; a completely logically consistent and unfalsified map may be drawn which corresponds to no actual territory. Logical self-consistency and lack of falsification are simply how we select the still-possible hypotheses, not how we select which are more likely than others.I agree with 2), a logical truism.3) is where I vehemently disagree, because personal preference is irrelevant to the probability of any given hypothesis. If the probabilities are equal, it is irrational to select one over the others; if the probability of one is greater than the others, it is irrational to make any other choice. Indeed. But again, the dice analogy only functions if we continue to allow that no evidence is present at all, that there is literally no distinction given by observations we can make that distinguishes hypothesis A from B from C. That's simply not the case in reality - we can make observations that adjust the probability of god-hypotheses in exactly the same way we can make observations that adjust the probability of our murder-hypotheses. Yes and no. The question in this case is not so much identifying specific false hypotheses. The question is determining those that are most likely to be true. If a mutually exclusive hypothesis is more likely to be true than competing hypotheses, then the other hypotheses are more likely to be false. If A XOR B, and A is more likely than B, then B is more likely to be false.Absolute falsification is extremely difficult, and some would say philosophically impossible. I would agree, which is why it's fortunate for me that this is not my argument.Simply being one of many with no additional information is akin to rolling a many-sided dice, and it is irrational to say that "I think x will be the result" when all of the other possibilities are equally likely. That does not in any way suggest that the most likely result is no result - this analogy only works in a literal total absence of evidence of any sort, a lack of any and all observations and testing. It means that arbitrarily choosing one as more likely because it is personally preferable is irrational, and that is all it was intended to illustrate. You seem to agree by saying that in such instances that agnosticism is the only rational position, which again makes me confused as to your own status as a deist and your previous comments on the subject.My analysis of all observations that I have made myself or am aware of is simply that the "no gods" hypothesis is more strongly supported than any of the god hypotheses. This is due to the fact that if we assume no gods, the Universe we would anticipate would have a high likelihood of matching what we actually observe, much like we would anticipate finding no body, no murder weapon, and no signs of a struggle if in fact no murder has occurred. If we assume gods, there would be a lower probability of a Universe where prayers aren't answered in a way statistically distinguishable from not praying; where all of the laws of nature make sense so far without any sort of divine requirement; etc.If it has a bill, swims in the water, is a warm-blooded vertebrate, and lays eggs, it might be a platypus, but it's most likely a duck.If I observe no dragon in my garage, there might be an invisible dragon, but it is more likely that there is simply not a dragon.The "no gods" hypothesis is not simply one of many - it is one that is supported by observations far more strongly than each individual god hypothesis, and therefore is more likely to be true. This means that any individual god hypothesis, barring additional observations that alter the relative probabilities, is likely to be false because it is mutually exclusive with a more likely hypothesis.Because the "no gods" hypothesis is more likely to be true than all competing hypotheses, I am compelled to tentatively select it as my "belief" in order to maintain rationality and logical self-consistency. If additional observations were made that would shift the probability significantly in favor of one or more god hypotheses such that any of them would then be greater than the "no god" hypothesis, then I would need to re-evaluate my position.For an actual test of hypotheses, I apply the same method to all propositions, of a religious nature or otherwise.Are there observations regarding the hypothesis that shift its probability meaningfully in either direction from a random guess? If not, how can you ensure that the map is in any way tied to any possible territory? Very few hypotheses have absolutely no observations that can be made.Are there any observations that would never be seen if the hypothesis were true? If so, test for those observations. Positive observation of something that the hypothesis does not allow falsifies the hypothesis.Are there competing hypotheses that better explain the observations? If so, those are hypotheses are more likely to be true, and the inferior hypothesis should be tentatively discarded pending new observations.It all boils down to Bayes' Theorem. The probability that a hypothesis is accurate given an observation is equivalent to the probability that the observation would be observed if the hypothesis were accurate, multiplied by the prior probability that the hypothesis was accurate prior to the observation, divided by the probability that the observation would be made across all hypotheses.If a hypothesis strongly predicts an observation that is highly unlikely across all possible hypotheses, then such an observation would be very strong evidence that the hypothesis is more accurate than others.If a hypothesis weakly predicts an observation ("x will happen 5% of the time") that is extremely likely to happen across all hypotheses, such an observation will reduce the probability that the hypothesis is accurate.I find that with regard to all relevant observations that I am personally aware of, the "no gods" hypothesis relatively strongly predicts the appearance of a wholly natural world with no need for divine influence, which is exactly what we see; and that this is unlikely to happen spread across all possible hypotheses, since most hypotheses include gods. This combination increases the probability that the "no gods" hypothesis is correct beyond the probabilities of competing god hypotheses. This occurs cumulatively with every observation that is strongly predicted by the "no gods" hypothesis, while simultaneously the continued observation of an absence of strongly predicted evidence for any god hypothesis reduces the likelihood that each is accurate. This leaves me with only one rational position:It is most likely the case that no gods exist, barring new observations that significantly change the relative probabilities of the relevant hypotheses. Indeed.

In what way? I'm making two separate claims here, which I think I've supported very well:1) in a true absence of evidence with all competing hypotheses being equal, selecting one to believe in, whether you call it "opinion" or not, is utterly irrational, because the real probability for the selected hypothesis is still no greater than the other possible selections.2) in reality, we do not have an absence of evidence. While most god hypotheses are equivalent to each other in probability of accuracy, the hypothesis that there are no gods is better supported by the observations we can make.1) is intended to point out the fact that even granting your basic premise (that we have zero knowledge about gods), your "opinion" is still irrational, even if you find it to be personally acceptable. This is not a straw man - it accurately reflects your argument from everything I have seen you post. If you still believe this to be inaccurate, please show me in detail where I am going astray in my conception of your position.2) is intended to show my own position, which has nothing at all to do with "opinion," but rather is a simple analysis of available observations. The absence of evidence always supports the hypothesis of absence more strongly than any other. Observing my desk with no pen more strongly supports the hypothesis that there is in fact no pen on my desk than the hypothesis that the pen is invisible. THis is not based on opinion, it is based on solid probability theory and common sense, unless you honestly believe that failing to observe a pen on my desk supports the hypothesis that the pen is invisible equally or more strongly than the hypothesis that the pen is simply not there, in which case you'd have to be insane.I don't care about your scale. I care about a rational analysis of the problem to determine which hypothesis is more likely, if any. Yes. The absence of an observation of a prediction always more strongly supports the hypothesis of absence more strongly than other possibilities.If a murder has been committed, we would rationally predict that we should find a body; a sign of struggle; a murder weapon; witnesses. If we observe none of those things, while it remains possible that there has in fact been a murder and the killer was simply very good at hiding the evidence, the hypothesis that no murder occurred was more likely to result in the actual observation of a lack of evidence, and so the most likely hypothesis is still that no murder occurred.Do you disagree? If so, why? Is there really a 50/50 chance that a murder has been committed in the absence of predicted evidence? Is it actually more likely that a murder has occurred if we can find no sign of it? RAZD, I'd like you to use my murder analogy to immediately show why the absence of predicted evidence is not in fact evidence that the hypothesis is false. Nobody has claimed (to my knowledge) that an absence of predicted evidence is absolute proof of absence; only that the failure to observe predicted evidence increases the likelihood that the hypothesis is false, that an absence of evidence is in fact evidence of absence.Remember - we have several hundred thousand individuals without alibis. Each is an unfalsified hypothetical killer. We have no witnesses to a murder, no signs of a struggle,no blood, no murder weapon, and no dead body. Is one of the several thousand possible hypothetical killers more likely than any of the others? Are any of them more likely than the hypothesis that no murder occurred?If you agree that the most likely hypothesis is that no murder occurred, then you are in agreement that the absence of predicted evidence is evidence of the absence of a murder.Projection much? I'm not weaseling one iota, and neither is my position based merely on my own subjective opinion.All god hypotheses make certain weak predictions - many say that at least sometimes we should see that events which are prayed for should occur more frequently than without prayer; believers in the appropriate deity should be more successful or more moral or more wise than nonbelievers; believers will be protected from harm more frequently than nonbelievers; believers should find "emotional peace" more frequently than nonbelievers; etc. The observation that none of these predictions are borne out in reality does not outright falsify any of them, since they typically only weakly predict such things in the first place. However, the hypothesis that there are no gods more strongly predicts that we should observe exactly what we see: belief in a specific deity has no statistically significant effect on the occurrence of desired events, morality, financial success, etc. This means that the observations that are available to us most strongly support the hypothesis that there are no gods.It's not a matter of opinion, RAZD. I'm not pulling it from my own mind. The fact that no amputee has ever been miraculously healed, ever, across all religions, is objectively true. The fact that prayer has no statistically meaningful effect has been shown in multiple double-blind studies. I'm not arbitrarily choosing a favored hypothesis due to some subjective preference. I'm looking at what the evidence more strongly supports. Bullshit.Given my murder scenario as proposed above, what is the most likely hypothesis, RAZD? I'm not asking for certainty - I'm well aware that we cannot know whether a murder occurred. But which hypothesis has the highest probability of being accurate? The actual observations are more strongly predicted by one hypothesis than all of the others, aren't they? Additional observations would of course force us to re-evaluate and possibly raise or lower the probability of one or more hypotheses and force us to change our conclusion, but I'm not afraid to change my mind in the face of new observations. Are you? Do you need to know the actual probabilities involved for my murder scenario, RAZD? Or are you actually fully capable of understanding that the observation of a lack of a body, the lack of a murder weapon, the lack of witnesses, and the lack of signs of a struggle, are all more strongly predicted by the hypothesis that no murder occurred than by the hypothesis that any individual might be the killer?Here: I'll draw it out for you. Please tell me at which specific step you may disagree.P(H|D)=P(D|H)*P(H)/P(D)I said "several hundred thousand" individuals had no alibi - let's just call it 200,000. This means we have more than 200,001 possible hypotheses (1 for "no murder," but it's possible there could be more than one killer in a conspiracy). For the purpose of estimation, we can just call it 200,001 hypotheses. We don;t need the exact numbers to illustrate my point.So, the prior probability (P(H)), the chance that any of those hypotheses is accurate before making any observations, is 1/200001.P(D), the chance that our observation (the lack of a dead body, etc) would be made across all possible hypotheses, is unknown, but will remain the same across all hypotheses; we can ignore it for the purpose of determining relative probability.This means that the most relevant part is P(D|H) - the probability that our observations would be made given that each hypothesis is true. In other words, how strongly does each hypothesis predict the observation?The hypothesis (let's call it H1) that Jimmy killed someone predicts that we should observe some sign of the event. There is an extremely low probability that Jimmy was able to commit the perfect murder and leave no trace at all. This is the same across all potential killers.The hypothesis that no murder occurred (let's call it H2) very strongly predicts that we should find no dead body, no murder weapon, etc.So, P(D|H1) < P(D|H2). I don't need to know the actual numerical probabilities - all I need to know for a quick estimate is the relative strength that the observations are predicted by each hypothesis.So let's take a look:P(D|H1) < P(D|H2)
P(H1) = 1/200,001 = P(H2)
P(D) remains the same across all hypotheses.This means that P(H1|D) < P(H2|D) for all possible values of P(D). Every hypothesis involving a murder more weakly predicts the observation of no dead body, no weapon, no struggle, etc than does the hypothesis involving no murder.Have I based any of this on "opinion?" If you were Deputy Dawg, what would your conclusion be? Would you write up a report of a homicide? Would you arrest anyone?This analogy works for literally any god hypothesis that makes even the barest, weakest prediction.The only god hypothesis it doesn't apply to is one that makes absolutely zero predictions, where no possible observation could alter the probability that the hypothesis is correct. This particular sort of hypothesis is a child's fantasy. Sure, it could be true, but only in the way that a completely blind guess could be true - there is nothing whatsoever to tie your map to the territory. Such a hypothesis is completely empty, lacking any sort of predictive power, and conveys no knowledge. In such a hypothesis, you could replace the word "god" with any other word, like "magic" or "phlogiston" or "Aether," with the same result. That sort of hypothesis is so useless that it doesn't even justify consideration.I'm not Straggler. I showed my analysis of the probabilities above. If you disagree with me, please feel free to show where and why. It doesn't have to be a specific number - we have these things called variables, and all that's required is to know whether x is greater than, less than, or equivalent to y. If we can determine those relationships for all the variables, then our conclusion will remain true regardless of the actual numbers represented by the variables. If x > y, then a*x > a*y, every time, regardless of the specific values of a, x, and y. Invalid analogy - there are no observations that can be made that will shift the probability of any possible hypothesis. There are observations that can be made surrounding all meaningful god hypotheses.In this case, any hypothesis would have no observations to tie its map to the actual territory; no hypothesis would have predictive power that could be tested through observation, since all possible observations would not shift the probability either way. Believing any hypothesis to be more likely than any others, regardless of whether it is "opinion" or not, is irrational.Your analogy suggests that your actual beliefs do in fact exemplify a hypothesis with zero predictive power, that a universe where your hypothesis is correct would look absolutely identical to all other conceivable universes. Is this the case? Is this why you insist that there is no evidence at all, because your god hypothesis happens to have zero utility and no actual reason to even so much as consider? False, as I showed in my murder analogy above. Which is, incidentally, an accurate model of identifying any hypothesis that actually has predictive power. All you need to know when comparing hypotheses given identical observations is the relative strength with which each hypothesis predicts the observations in order to know which one is better supported by the evidence. You won't be able to say "hypothesis x has a 24% chance of accuracy," but you will be able to say that "the probability that hypothesis x is correct is greater than that of hypothesis y."

Yet if it actually occurs, then it does obey the rules of nature - our understanding of those rules is simply flawed.There are many maps, Hyro, but only one territory. If we find some part of the territory that isn't on our current map, that doesn't mean we keep our map and just say "that part of the territory is outside the bounds of our map." Instead, we re-draw our map to incorporate the newly discovered territory.That which is "supernatural" is simply an asserted phenomenon that would not be explained by our current understanding of the Universe. It's not so much that it's subjective, it's more that it has no predictive power. You could replace the word "supernatural" with anything and not meaningfully change any relevant hypothesis. Saying "ghosts are supernatural" is functionally identical to saying "ghosts are made of ectoplasm," or "ghosts are magic," or "ghosts function on a different plane of existence." None of those statements allows us to make any prediction that could be supported or falsified by any observation. ...as we currently underastand nature. Remember, the map is not the territory, and the incidence of our map failing to encompass all of the territory simply means that we need to re-draw. If there are "other planes of existence," then there are simply additional areas of the territory of which we are currently unaware. If we become aware of them, we can then begin adding them to our map.Imagine you live in Europe in the year 1490. You've never heard of the "New World," because it hasn't been discovered yet. How much space do the Caribbean Islands take up? What are the coordinates of the Grand Canyon?Your map doesn't include those locations, because you are currently unaware of that portion of the territory.Now come back to 2010. Do you still refuse to add the Grand Canyon or the Caribbean Islands to your map?Our map of the territory, our understanding of the Universe, changes as we make new discoveries about what does and does not exist. "Supernatural" is a useless term because it simply means "potential parts of a map that may or may not reflect the territory." Once we have thoroughly investigates a "supernatural" phenomenon, it becomes incorporated into our ever-updating map. That depends on the specific god hypothesis. Most god hypotheses make predictions whcih can then be tested.Now, you are right that it's almost impossible to falsify most god hypotheses - that requires an observation that is absolutely predicted to never happen if the specific god hypothesis is true. That's not very common - it isn't even very common in science.It is however possible to analyze the relative probabilities of various hypotheses be asking how strongly each hypothesis predicts any given observation. Remember, we don't live in a binary world - we don;t get to know with certainty that hypothesis x is absolutely false and hypothesis y is absolutely true. But if hypothesis x has a 23% chance of accuracy and hypothesis y has a 4% chance, then the rational position is that "x is more likely to be accurate than y." Uncertainty is part of the game - we can never ever be certain of anything, ever. Remember, it's possible that we're all in the Matrix, or that I'm a figment of your imagination. If I throw my pen up in the air, there is a tiny little possibility that it will simply stay there, and that our modern theory of gravity is absolutely wrong.The question is not "are we sure?" The question is "what appears to be most likely given the information we have." Remember, we can always change our minds later if further observations compel us to do so. I know both you and I have already changed our minds concerning theism at least once. Just as important as identifying the most likely hypothesis is learning to accept that, when your personal beliefs and reality clash, reality always wins int eh end.I'm not afraid to be wrong. In fact, I know I'm wrong. But I'm also less wrong than I was a decade ago. Don't try to be right - when you're right, you'll defend your beliefs long after you should have changed them. Your beliefs can never become stronger and more accurate than they are right now unless they change. Try to be less wrong instead. Identify the inaccuracies in your own beliefs and discard them in favor of more accurate positions. Of course it is - simply because we like to be right, we like to be sure, and often we like what God represents. It's a problem of human cognition - we will instinctively tend to assign a higher estimation of probability to results that we find personally satisfying. That's why rational consideration of evidence is necessary, and why it's difficult to do. But again, we don't live in a binary universe. We can;t say with certainty "this is right" and "this is wrong." We can say "this is more likely than that."I'm an atheist, not because of some arbitrary opinion, not because I find the prospect of no-gods to be more personally satisfying, not because I think I can positively prove that gods don;t exist.I'm an atheist because when I look at each god hypothesis of which I am aware, the observations I make in the real world more closely match the predictions of the hypothesis that there are no gods.I don't disbelieve in "the supernatural." I fully acknowledge that there is more territory than we have mapped out, and some of that unmapped territory could be identified as "supernatural." I simply strive to constantly modify my personal map to more closely reflect the territory of the universe - which means adding the most likely hypotheses to my set of beliefs and tentatively discarding the less likely until additional observations prompt a revision.If next month physicists discover that the laws of physics we know today are simply a subset of a much more complicated system that allows for events that would appear to violate the laws we think we know today, I would simply have to update my map to incorporate that previously unknown territory as we discover more of the real rules that govern existence.

Even that which is entirely the product of a human mind may actually exist. The idea of the Matrix is entirely conceived by human minds, yet is possibly true.The issue is simply that "it might be true" is not ever good enough for anything, ever. There are an infinite number of conceivable hypotheses for just about anything that could be true - the deciding factor is which hypotheses are more likely to be true than the others.When presented with an observation regarding a hypothesis, one should never ever ask "does this observation allow me to believe my hypothesis to be true?"The correct question is "does this observation compel me to believe my hypothesis to be true?"Every observation I could conceivably make would allow me to believe that some nonspecific deity may exist, or that we live in the Matrix, or that all of life is just a dream, or that I have an invisible dragon in my garage.But there are no observations that compel me to believe those hypotheses to be true over any others. Belief is a game of relative probability - what we believe is simply that which we think is most likely to be true. I cannot honestly say that I think that it is most likely that we live in the Matrix above all other possible competing hypotheses, so I cannot believe that we live in teh Matrix - I would need compelling evidence to justify such a belief, even though it may still be true.Disbelief is not the same as a negative claim. You and I and everyone else disbelieve a thousand things every day before lunchtime; I disbelieve that I will run into an invisible bicyclist on my way to work, or that my office will have been replaced by a McDonalds overnight. I disbelieve because those hypotheses are less likely to be true than competing hypotheses (such as the hypothesis that if I cannot see a bicyclist in a given location, there is not in fact a bicyclist there; or the hypothesis that demolishing a large building and replacing it with a McDonalds would take more than a single night's work).Without compelling evidence, possibly-true hypotheses are discarded as unlikely. That's the very heart of Occam's Razor. But note that "unlikely" is not the same as "false." Broken clocks are right twice each day, and the fanciful imagination of a child may in fact describe some part of reality simply by chance.But if you ask what time it is, I'm not going to believe that broken clock simply because it is less likely to be accurate than it is to be telling the wrong time. I disbelieve the less likely hypothesis.Uncertainty never ever justifies belief, for the same reason it is irrational to believe that the stopped clock is actually telling the correct time. Possibility in no way conveys greater probability; believing the stopped clock to be telling the incorrect time is always more likely to be true.

Forgive me, Jar, but what you just said quite explicitly means that you cannot imagine this "god" thing.You're able to say that "god" is supposed to be the "creator of all that is," but that's not actually a property of this "god" thing.It's nothing more than a mysterious answer to a mysterious question. Your "god" leaves us exactly as ignorant regarding the mysteries of the origin of reality (if there is such a thing) as we were before you used the term.When I imagine a car, I can tell you specific properties that make it a car - wheels, a passenger compartment, an engine of some sort, and so on. When you ask how I arrived at work today, when I tell you "I drove here in my car," you have an actual explanation as to my mode of transportation that leaves you possessing more information than you had previously (because it eliminates such possibilities as train, bus, taxi, walking, bike, or even outlandish conceivable possibilities like teleportation).When you try to imagine a perfectly straight line, you can tell me the properties of that line. You can tell me that such a line will never intersect a perpendicular line; that it can be defined by any two points in space; that it stretches infinitely in both directions; that it defines a single dimension, as opposed to a two-dimensional plane or a three-dimensional cube or even a dimensionless point; that such a line would lie on an infinite number of two-dimensional planes, and so on. The definition of a perfectly straight line is extremely specific and precise, and cannot be confused with even similar things like rays or even line segments.When you imagine this "god" thing as an explanation for where "everything" came from, no possibilities have been eliminated. No descriptive qualities are conveyed. "God" is not an answer - it's a password that simply stops your curiosity without providing any new information.You haven't "imagined" anything beyond a word.The fact that you can only define "god" in extremely general terms means that it isn't actually defined at all. To be defined, you have to be able to distinguish the thing represented by the word from things that are not represented by the word.As a thought experiment, try replacing the word "god" with a made-up word, and see if it makes just as much sense.If you ask how I got to work today and I say "phlogiston," or "magic," you would notice that you are confused and still don't know how I arrived at work. Would you have any more information if I responded with the word "god?"If you ask how the Universe came to be, do you have more or less information by answering "phlogiston," "magic," "marklar," or "god?" Perhaps one satisfies your curiosity more, but do you actually have more information about the origins of the Universe by using any of those answers?If, a hundred years from now, we actually explain with certainty the origin of the Universe, and we call the theory "phlogiston theory," would that mean that those who answer the question today with the word "phlogiston" actually knew all along? Does the possible future definition of a word convey present meaning?

I don't think you'd ever see disagreement from me, Straggler, or RAZD on that point. The map is not the territory.What's been rankling Straggler for months now (and prompted me to limit participation in threads that start down this road) is that RAZD claims that it is rational to hold any unfalsified logically valid position - that tentative belief or disbelief is a matter of personal opinion.As it related to deities, RAZD says that the only truly logical position is total agnosticism, but that it is perfectly rational to slightly believe or disbelieve in gods according to one's own opinion.Straggler and I (and others) disagree rather strongly. We think that there are several reasons to believe that the existence of gods is less likely than the nonexistence of gods, and so the only rational belief is that gods tentatively do not exist, pending additional evidence. We don't think "opinion" has anything to do with it, that it's simply the only rational conclusion (ie, the most likely amongst all logically valid hypotheses).

Why?What are your criteria for being labeled "rational?"

But that's not what I asked. I asked for your criteria for labeling a belief "rational." You've given basically a single example of a belief you would identify as rational, but not why. If I were you, how would I go about selecting which beliefs are rational, and which are not?

That's a single example. Let me put this into perspective:Imagine you've never seen another human being before, and I tell you "Jimmy is tall." Would you have any way to tell if Jonny is also tall, or short, or what the difference is?So far you've told me that, in the absence of any evidence, "I don't know" or "I don't believe that" are both rational answers to a mysterious question. But why are those rational answers? Would "I think so" be irrational then? If so, why?What about when there is evidence? Suppose there is very slight evidence that bigfoot exists. Is belief in bigfoot rational? Is continued disbelief in bigfoot rational due to the weak support of the evidence? Does uncertainty convey rationality to any logically valid position? I'm not asking you to. I'm asking you what criteria you use to determine which beliefs are rational, so that I can understand your reasoning.Would it help if I gave my own criteria for identifying rational vs. irrational beliefs?

Well, likewise I have no real way to differentiate "rational" vs "irrational" from what you've told me. I don't know what qualifies one belief as "rational" to jar and what does not.I have a very simple test for determining which belief is rational, given that a "belief" is defined as the hypothesis that an individual thinks has the greatest probability of being true:The rational belief in any set of logically valid competing hypotheses is the one determined to have the greatest probability of accuracy given available evidence. To believe any other hypothesis other than the most probable is irrational. In the case of exactly equal probabilities, the only rational belief is to simply state that the answer may be any of the equally probable hypotheses.In the case of a toss of a six-sided dice, any belief that a specific number will come up is irrational; the only rational belief is that the result will be an integer between one and six. Believing that the result could be twelve, or 4.3, would be irrational.Given a case where Hypothesis A) has a 51% chance of being true, Hypothesis B) has a 49% chance, it would only be rational to believe Hypothesis A).Given a case where Hypothesis A) has a 45% chance of being true, Hypothesis B) has a 30% chance, and Hypotheses C) has a 25% chance, it would only be rational to believe that Hypothesis A) is most likely true; it would be more irrational to believe that Hypothesis C) is true than to believe Hypothesis B) is true.This works for any and all hypotheses. Given equal information and correct math, it should be impossible for perfectly rational individuals to disagree on matters of objective fact (as opposed to things like color preference). All beliefs are tentative to the degree that the hypotheses they represent are likely to be true.Would you agree that this is a good definition for the word "rational?" If not, why not?

Super-simple method?Assuming there is zero evidence on the matter of the existence or nonexistence of the asserted entity, it's more likely that the entity does not exist than that it does. It's a simple matter of probability - joint probability is multiplicative.The probability that the Universe exists as we observe it is greater than the probability that the Universe exists as we observe it AND there exists this unevidenced deity.It's the long way of saying "Occam's Razor." Hypotheses that include additional unnecessary terms are less likely to be accurate than those that include only those entities that are required.Other reasons to disbelieve in any given entity depend on the specifics of that entity. If you claim the existence of something (god, machine, whatever) that is able to completely disregard or even break well-established laws of physics, for example, the likelihood of your hypothesis would be somewhere on the order of the uncertainty of the specific law(s) of physics your hypothesized entity would completely invalidate.The initial unlikelihood of the existence of an asserted deity or other unevidenced entity must be overcome with observations that increase the likelihood that the entity exists beyond the level of the hypothesis that the Universe exists as we observe it without this new entity - in other words, evidence.Let me give an example. Which of these hypotheses is more likely than the others, given that I have a friend named Susan?A) I have a friend named Susan who has blonde hair.
B) I have a friend named Susan with blonde hair who is employed as a teacher.In this problem, we actually have two assertions about Susan. The first is easy to evaluate - the likelihood that Susan has blonde hair is equal to the percentage of blondes in the general population. The second is also easy - the likelihood that Susan is a teacher is equal to the percentage of teachers in the general population.The probability that BOTH are simultaneously true, however, is less likely than each individual assertion because joint probability is multiplicative. Let's say that 15% of people are blonde, and 5% of people are teachers. The probability that Susan is BOTH blonde AND a teacher is .15 * .05, or 0.75% - far less likely than either one individually.We need evidence in the form of observations - the rational conclusion at this point is that it is MORE LIKELY that Susan is blonde than that she is blonde AND a school teacher. If we actually observe her with blonde hair, then the likelihood that she is blonde shoots to near certainty; if we observe her teaching a class, so too does the likelihood that she is also a schoolteacher.Without actual observations that increase the likelihood of any previously unobserved entity (including gods) actually existing, their existence is less likely than that our Universe exists without them.

Evidence is not subjective. Evidence is an observation that alters the probability that a hypothesis is true. An observation cannot positively affect the probability of a hypothesis for one person, and negatively affect or be neutral to the probability of that hypothesis for another person at the same time - one of them is wrong. Evidence is not a matter of equally-valid opinion. Evidence is a matter of fact.A written story that makes assertions does not significantly affect the probability that those assertions are true. Not ever. Your use of the word "tough" does not lend strength to your argument - rather, it betrays the fact that you simply intend to stubbornly hold to an objectively false position.