Thoughts On Robin Collins and the Many Universe Generator

The crux of this entire argument seems to me to be entirely flawed. The idea is that the series of events needed to have occurred for human life to have developed is highly unlikely, thus an intervening agent or creator is needed. This argument is the same one used over and over by creationists. It is merely being applied to a cosmological scale here. The idea is flawed in that it assumes that human life is somehow a desired outcome instead of a random one.To explain, consider rolling a 10 sided dice (makes the math easier). You decide to do so ten times. You get the series 1,8,2,7,6,10,1,5,3,4. That is an entirely normal outcome of the random process. To look at this result and be stunned by the simply calculated fact that there is only a 1 in 10,000,000,000 chance of that exact result is completely facile.Using the dice, some number had to come up. No one result is any more remarkable then any other, yet each is very unlikely. The same holds for the universe. Given that the universe (or by extension any preconditions needed for the existence of the universe) exists, it is utterly unremarkable that it ended up producing human life. That's just what happened.

Your argument from personal incredulity, Hangdawg13, is clearly irrelevant. That you see a deity as the only explanation for the existence of the universe is no evidence for the existence of a deity.However, you pose two questions I will address. "Why does the universe exist?" and "Why do the universes natural laws exist?"The underlying assumption that it appears must be made to even ask your two questions is that the existence of the universe and the ways in which it works somehow require a purpose. If one does not assume that some metaphysical purpose is needed, then the answer to both questions is "For no reason or purpose, they merely are."Since you do pose the two questions, it appears you do hold the assumption I stated above. If I am wrong, please let me know. That being the case, I would be forced to question your assumption. What reason can you give for accepting the premise as given that the universe requires a "purpose".A definition of purpose in this context would also be welcome.

More precisely, my assertion would be that unless one presupposes a deity, your questions are moot. We seem to be in agreement on that point. Whether the proposition of a deity is a sound one is, of course, highly debatable.You go on to suggest replacing "why" with "how" in your questions and state, "I still hold that it is impossible to answer these questions with a "natural" answer."I will admit that these new questions have not been answered by science yet, but why would you assume they cannot be? I would like a more complete explanation, please. It seems well within the realm of possibility to me.This really a side note, but your logic is flawed in your closing example. A theory that completely and accurately describes the universe would by definition also describe itself, as it is contained in the universe.

In addressing this, I would first like to comment on your phrasing. Originally, you posed questions concerning "why", which implies purpose. we agreed that the existence of a purpose in our context is entirely contingent on the existence of a deity and tabled that point. You then suggested that "why" should be substituted with "how", which implies a factual finding of the ways in which a thing happened. Now you use "why/how" as if the two are similar in meaning, which they are not, or that both points should be addressed, one of which already has been. If we may, I would like to request that we not backtrack.Your contention that "No natural law can explain why/how nature exists" is baffling to me. If one takes "natural law" to mean a well constructed and firmly established set of theories, then "why" is beyond their purview and unimportant, there being no philosophic or scientific problem with saying that a thing has no purpose and merely is. "How" is exactly the thing such a set of theories are describing. If your contention is that no set of theories about a system can describe the origin of that system, I must ask that you somehow support your contention beyond simply stating it.

You are repeating yourself. Let me once more request some support for the following statement (other then a restatement of it):"Even if we found a theory that described the behavior of everything in the universe including itself, it could not explain how it exists without being circular. It could explain how it works now that it is in existence, but it cannot explain how or why it is in existence."A circular argument is one in which a premise is the same as the conclusion. How is that criticism applicable to our proposed theory of everything that also accounts for it's own and the universe's existence? I can see no logical bar to to such a formulation. If you can, please point it out.

Perhaps we are at an impasse. I cannot address your point if you cannot explain it. Still, I will make one more attempt.There is a theory that describes all events, from the largest structure events down to the quantum level. From this theory, we can predict how the universe is formed and a test of it is possible, and our theory is supported. We can also predict and describe the formation of planets, and again we are proved right. The pattern continues; abiogeneisis is described and explained, evolution, weather, human development, intelligence, communication, right down the line. Our theory works each and every time on everything. We take the time to consider the development of theories in light of our own and realize that the theory complies with itself, as it must.In what way is the above circular? Remember that a circular argument is one where one of it's premises matches the conclusion. Why would "this theory exists" be an essential premise?

I do not believe what I wrote can be reasonably described as "vehement".In any case, your allegation is entirely inaccurate. In Collins' opening he states, "In the last thirty years, the argument from the fine-tuning of the cosmos has steadily gained in popularity, often being considered the strongest single argument for the existence of God. The "fine-tuning" of the cosmos refers to the claim that the fundamental parameters or constants of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are set just right for life to occur."His argument is, at it's core, that the universe exists in such a way as to sustain life, in spite of the fact that such a thing may by some measures be highly improbable; thus some active force is needed to guide it.Collins is merely pushing the failed logic of the argument from design out to a cosmological level. There are many classical arguments showing why this is flawed and I see no need to repeat them here. The point I made, while hardly novel, was an attempt to show the error of looking at a series of random events after the fact and assuming anything special about the particular outcome that happened to occur.

No, I did not just read the first paragraph, and you had no reason to believe I did. The foundation of Collin's position, and it's errors are outlined in that opening passage. If you would care to respond to that, I would be happy to engage you.However, on a personal note, I have been nothing but polite in any posting to you and you are responding rudely, assusing me of glossing an issue as well as being close minded. There is no reason for me to stomach such insults and I will not do so.If your care to respond in a civil, meaningful way, then I will have a discussion with you. Otherwise, I will ignore you.

Paulk is ably pointing out one of the classic responses to the argument from design that I mentioned earlier.Why is a high degree of complexity with no designer allowed on one level (i.e. the creator) but not on any other?