Tran writes:
Because ultimate presuppositions are basic, you cannot appeal to anything more basic than they, so the only appeal available is in the
form of a horizontal comparison. Its true that TA argues that other world-views are internally inconsistent. The proper response to
such a finding would be to give up the inconsistent one for a consistent one.
PaulK writes:
Now this is in response to my point that you had not made such a comparison. Therefore it concedes my point that you had not made such an argument, since you say a comparison is needed and no genuine comparison was provided.
That’s fine. To shorten the argument then, let me revise it to say that the goal of TA as I understand it is to show how a world-view A, if it were true, would lead to skepticism or incoherence.
It also implies that actually producing the TA would be impractical since individual comparisions with all other world-views is simply not possible.
Practically speaking, with my new understanding of TA, all I would need to show is that your world-view is internally problematic, since I would be arguing against you, and not the rest of the world.
The only sensible way to actually argue for the TA would be to lay out the relevant elements of your orldview and show that they are truly necessary.
I think it would be satisfactory to demonstrate at least one necessary precondition for intelligibility, and then ask the opposing world-view to show how it can meet that requirement. In kind, I would show how mine does as well.
Let me shoot from the hip: A necessary precondition for intelligibility is at least some form of universal, invariant law of thought that can be universally applied to any situation with predictable results such that knowledge can be built on prior experience
I gave an example of how the Christian world-view, if it were true, would have no problem accommodating something that is invariant, abstract and universal in nature. One example was God Himself.
Tran writes:
The term entity in ‘abstract entity— does not refer to a physical object. Here is an example of what it means for an abstract entity to be universal.
PaulK writes:
I don't need to reproduce your example because it does not address my point. Universality cannot be the same as omnipresence since non-spatial entities cannot be said to be present or absent. That is the point you need to address.
Use this biblical definition instead: God is infinite in being, invisible, without body or parts; immutable, immense, eternal, most absolute.
PaulK writes:
I add that my view of logic is radically different from the one you seem to be proposing. It would make sense if you were to make your ideas about logic explicit and justify them
I can only go on what you give me, which so far isn’t much, so I’ve based my argument on the materialist world-view. I never claimed that it was your world-view. See above for my justification.
Tran writes:
A law of negation tells us these sentences cannot be true at the same time in the same sense. Is this law spacial? No. Is it everywhere? Yes. This law holds true whether you are in a class room or driving in a rover on planet Mars.
PaulK writes:
This is a contradiction. You assert that logic is non-spatial and then presuppose that it is spatial by stating that it is "everywhere". No, it is meaningless to state that it is "everywhere" or "anywhere".
It should be obvious what I mean by the term everywhere, especially when it is placed in context of what I mean when I’m using it. So replace the term everywhere with the term universal if it’s hanging you up.
Tran writes:
You need to account for it if you want to be taken seriously. If your world-view says that the only things that exists in this world are matter, yet you grant existence to such things as laws which are not matter, then you are being arbitrary and cant complain if someone just matter of factly says youre wrong without trying to support that claim.
PaulK writes:
Of course the only assertion I have made relevant to this is that my worldview holds that abstract entities are non-spatial - a statement that you have agreed to. You have even agreed to that, so there is no need for me to defend it.
If you insist that my worldview has to account for statements which do not even make sense before you will take me seriously then there is no point in discussion. I'm not about to change my worldview just because it would help your argument - that would be silly. So please do not make such demands.
I said if your world-view says that so far you haven’t confessed to materialism, or anything for that matter. I’m currently under the microscope, and willingly so but at some point I hope you will come out of the closet.
PaulK writes:
But you haven't yet accounted for logic - or even explained how in your worldview it actually works.
See above. The Christian world-view assumes a world containing universal, abstract entities, so there is no conceptual problem with having laws in that world-view.
Secondly, I’m not sure if you’re asking the mechanics of logic or how logic interacts with my world-view, so I’ll answer both. I don’t know the mechanics, neither do I think that it is necessary to know how in order to say that they exist or are possible. How they interact in the Christian world-view is that God created man in His image, and man was created such that man could understand the commands of God. Because logic is a prerequisite for knowledge, and knowledge is required for understanding (God), man was made such that he can perceive it.
PaulK writes:
Indeed lets assume that your creator was totally different - do you assert that some other creator could have created a universe where logic failds to work ? Does the idea of such a universe even make sense ? If not then surely how the universe came to be is irrelevant to that question.
I would say that it is incoherent to assume a different creator, which is why the TA argues that non-Christian world-views are incoherent or at least lead to skepticism.
Tran writes:
Epistemology is the study of how we know what we know. The Transcendental Argument addresses the question by answering the question "What preconditions are necessary for intelligibility?" If there is a "problem", then the first place you should look are your ultimate presuppositions since those are the foundations of knowledge. Presuppositions are assumed, but profound epistemological skepticism results from presuppositions that conflict with each other, which is why world-views need to be examined internally and compared with each other.
PaulK writes:
Again this fails to address my point. Problems *with* presuppositions can be addressed by adopting better presuppositions. But other problems such as Cartesian Doubt can not be dealt with in such a way. I repeat a presupposiiton is an assumption and no conclusion cna be more certain than the assumptions it rests on. The more you rely on assumptions and the less certain they are the less reliable your conclusions will be.
Please explain what you mean by Cartesian Doubt. I don’t deny that presuppositions can be adopted on discovery of problematic ones.
PaulK writes:
This seems to be a sound reason for not making such extravagant and far reaching presuppositions as your idea of God above. Unless you adopt a "true-for-you" relativist view of truth you are at great risk of falling prey to false certainty.
Develop this a bit further for me, because it’s not clear to me which presuppositions that I hold are far reaching. Since I certainly don’t wish to fall prey to false certainty, can you give me a definition of certainty, then give me an example of a true certainty about the world we live in, and how you know that certainty to be true.
Thanks.
Regardless, the "sharing" is obviously irrating to many; it doesn't take but a quick perusal thru the threads to see that. Nice try though!
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